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Optimal contracting in networks

机译:网络中的最佳合同

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We study optimal contracting between a firm selling a divisible good that exhibits positive externality and a group of agents in a social network. The extent of externality that each agent receives from the consumption of neighboring agents is privately held and is unknown to the firm. By explicitly characterizing the optimal multilateral contract, we demonstrate how inefficiency in an agent's trade propagates through the network and creates unequal and network-dependent downward distortion in other agents' trades. Furthermore, we describe bilateral contracts (non-linear pricing schemes) and characterize their explicit dependence on the network structure. We show that the firm will benefit from uncertainty in an agent's valuation of other agents' externality. We describe the profit gap between multilateral and bilateral contracts and analyze the consequences of the explicit dependence of the contracts on network structure. When the network is balanced in terms of homogeneity of agents' influence, network structure has no impact on the firm's profit for bilateral contracts. On the other hand, when the influences are heterogeneous with high dispersion (as in core-periphery networks) the restriction to bilateral contracts can result in profit losses that grow unbounded with the size of networks. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:我们研究了销售具有正外部性的可分割商品的公司与社交网络中的一组代理商之间的最佳合同。每个代理商从相邻代理商的消费中获得的外部性程度是私人持有的,并且对于公司而言是未知的。通过明确地描述最佳多边合同的特征,我们证明了代理商交易的低效率如何通过网络传播,并在其他代理商交易中造成不平等且依赖网络的下行扭曲。此外,我们描述了双边合同(非线性定价方案)并描述了它们对网络结构的明确依赖。我们表明,公司将从代理对其他代理外部性估值的不确定性中受益。我们描述了多边和双边合同之间的利润差距,并分析了合同明确依赖网络结构的后果。当网络在代理人影响的同质性方面保持平衡时,网络结构对双边合同的公司利润没有影响。另一方面,当影响是异构的且具有高度分散性时(如在核心外围网络中),对双边合同的限制可能导致利润损失,而该损失随网络规模的增长而无限增长。 (C)2019 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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