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Market signaling with grades

机译：有等级的市场信号

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摘要

We consider a signaling model in which receivers observe both the sender's costly signal as well as a stochastic grade that is correlated with the sender's type. In equilibrium, the sender resolves the tradeoff between using the costly signal versus relying on the noisy grade to distinguish himself. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition-loosely, that the grade is sufficiently informative relative to the dispersion of (marginal) signaling costs across types-under which the presence of grades substantively alters the equilibrium predictions. Specifically, separating equilibria do not survive stability-based refinements. Instead, the prediction depends on the prior distribution over the sender's type. For example, with two types it involves full pooling when the distribution places sufficient weight on the high type and partial pooling otherwise. Finally, the equilibrium converges to the complete-information outcome as the distribution tends to a degenerate one-resolving a long-standing paradox within the signaling literature.
机译：我们考虑一个信号模型，在该模型中，接收者既观察发送者的昂贵信号，又观察与发送者类型相关的随机等级。在平衡状态下，发送方解决了使用代价高昂的信号与依靠噪声等级来区分自己之间的权衡问题。我们得出一个必要和充分的条件-宽松地讲，该等级相对于（边际）信号成本在各个类型之间的分散具有足够的信息性-在这种情况下，等级的存在会实质上改变均衡预测。具体而言，分离平衡不能幸免于基于稳定性的改进。相反，预测取决于发送者类型上的先验分布。例如，对于两种类型，当分配将足够的权重放在高类型上时，它涉及全池，否则则涉及部分池。最后，由于分布趋于退化，从而解决了信号文献中长期存在的悖论，因此平衡收敛到完整的信息结果。

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