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Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

机译:广义势和稳健的均衡集

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摘要

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.
机译:本文介绍了完全信息博弈的广义潜在功能,并研究了均衡集对不完全信息的鲁棒性。如果每个不完整的信息博弈几乎总是由完整的信息博弈给出的,那么一个完整的信息博弈的均衡集就很鲁棒了。本文针对广义势函数的argmax集,为均衡集的鲁棒性提供了充分条件。这些充分条件统一并概括了现有的充分条件。我们对潜在博弈的概括在其他应用了潜在方法的博弈理论问题中很有用。

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