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首页> 外文期刊>Journal Economics & Management Strategy >Rent sharing to control noncartel supply in the German cement market
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Rent sharing to control noncartel supply in the German cement market

机译：分摊租金以控制德国水泥市场的非卡特尔供应

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摘要

A challenge for many cartels is avoiding a destabilizing increase in noncartel supply in response to having raised price. In the case of the German cement cartel that operated over 1991-2002, the primary source of noncartel supply was imports from Eastern European cement manufacturers. Testimonies in a private enforcement case have claimed that the cartel sought to control imports by sharing rents with intermediaries in order to discourage them from sourcing foreign supply. Specifically, cartel members would allow an intermediary to issue the invoice for a transaction and charge a fee even though the output went directly from the cartel member's plant to the customer. We investigate this claim by first developing a theory of collusive pricing that takes account of the option of bribing intermediaries. The theory predicts that the cement cartel members are more likely to share rents with an intermediary when the nearest Eastern European plant is closer and there is more Eastern European capacity outside of the control of the cartel. Estimating a logit model that predicts when a cartel member sells through an intermediary, the empirical analysis supports both predictions.
机译：许多卡特尔所面临的挑战是避免非卡特尔供应因价格上涨而不稳定地增长。就经营1991年至2002年的德国水泥卡特尔而言，非卡特尔供应的主要来源是从东欧水泥制造商那里进口的。在一个私人执法案件中的证词声称，卡特尔试图通过与中介人分担租金来控制进口，以阻止他们从国外采购货源。具体来说，卡特尔成员将允许中间人为交易开具发票并收取费用，即使其输出直接从卡特尔成员的工厂流向客户也是如此。我们首先开发一种考虑到贿赂中介人的合谋定价理论来调查这种说法。该理论预测，当最近的东欧工厂距离更近，并且在卡特尔无法控制的范围内有更多的东欧产能时，水泥卡特尔成员更有可能与中间人分摊租金。估计可预测卡特尔成员何时通过中介进行销售的logit模型，经验分析支持这两种预测。

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