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Learning quality through prices and word-of-mouth communication

机译：通过价格和口碑传播学习质量

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This paper studies the effect of word-of-mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word-of-mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high-quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low-quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high-quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low-quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word-of-mouth communication improves consumer welfare.
机译：本文研究了口碑传播对新体验商品最优定价策略的影响。我考虑一个动态的垄断模型，该模型具有关于产品质量的不对称信息，在该模型中，消费者可以均衡地向价格和其他消费者学习。主要结果是口碑传播对于存在分离均衡至关重要，其中，高质量的垄断者通过低的介绍价格（低于垄断价格）来表示高质量，而低质量的垄断者则向其收费。垄断价格。直觉很简单：低价是昂贵的，只有足够有信心的公司才能使用，以至于增加的试验（以及消费者之间的交流）将产生有关质量和增加的未来利润的好消息。附加结果如下：对于高质量卖方，预期价格（数量）随时间增加（减少）；而对于低质量的，则相反。此外，当消费者较少关注同行的报告而更多关注过去的价格时，发出信号将变得更加困难。最后，口碑传播可以改善消费者的福利。

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