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Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information

机译：不完全信息下的不对称顺序搜索

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摘要

We study a multistage sequential search model with n agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities, which are private information, are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage, the designer chooses an ability threshold. If an agent has a higher ability than the threshold in the stage in which he arrives, he gets the job and the search is over. The agent's ability is not revealed when he wins the job and the designer has only an estimation of this ability according to the threshold placed by him. We analyze the optimal ability thresholds imposed by the designer who wishes to maximize the ability estimation of the agent who gets the job net of the search cost. We also investigate the relation between the optimal ability thresholds as well as the optimal order of agents in all stages according to the agents' distributions of abilities.
机译：我们研究了竞争一个工作的n个代理的多阶段顺序搜索模型。代理顺序到达，每个代理处于不同的阶段。代理的能力是私人信息，是从异构分布函数中得出的。在每个阶段，设计人员都会选择一个能力阈值。如果业务代表在其到达的阶段具有比阈值更高的能力，则他会找到工作并且搜索结束。代理人胜任工作时不会透露其能力，而设计师只能根据其下达的门槛来估计其能力。我们分析了由设计人员施加的最佳能力阈值，他们希望最大化获得工作净额搜索成本的代理商的能力估计。我们还根据代理人的能力分布，研究了各个阶段的最优能力阈值以及代理人的最佳顺序之间的关系。

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