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首页> 外文期刊>Journal Economics & Management Strategy >One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting mechanism
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One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting mechanism

机译：一站式购物成为上档费的原因：一种租金转移机制

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摘要

Consumers increasingly prefer to bundle their purchases into a single shopping trip, inducing complementaries between initially independent or substitutable goods. Taking this one-stop shopping behavior into account, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party negotiation framework, where a monopolistic retailer negotiates sequentially with two suppliers about two-part tariff contracts. If the goods are initially independent or sufficiently differentiated, the wholesale price negotiated with the first supplier is upward distorted. This allows the retailer and the first supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. To compensate the retailer for the higher wholesale price, the first supplier pays a slotting fee as long as its bargaining power vis-a-vis the retailer is not too large.
机译：消费者越来越喜欢将购买的商品捆绑成一个购物行程，从而在最初独立或可替代的商品之间产生互补。考虑到这种一站式的购物行为，我们表明，在三方谈判框架中，由于租金转移机制而产生的排班费可能出现，在这种情况下，一家垄断的零售商与两个供应商就两部分的关税合同进行顺序谈判。如果货物最初是独立的或有足够的差异性，则与第一个供应商协商的批发价格会向上扭曲。这允许零售商和第一供应商从第二供应商提取租金。为了补偿零售商较高的批发价格，只要第一供应商相对于零售商的议价能力不大，便要支付上门费。

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