• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy >Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets
【24h】

Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets

机译：游戏医院玩：医院程序市场中的进入威慑力

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions.
机译：战略投资模型虽然在理论文献中很流行，但很少经过经验检验。本文建立了住院程序市场战略投资模型，该模型非常适合对此行为进行实证检验。在这样的市场中容易发现潜在进入者，这使研究人员能够准确地估计不同在位者所面临的进入威胁。我从患者需求，手术质量和差异化产品竞争的模型中得出了直接的入口威慑力实证测试。利用医院关于电生理研究，侵入性心脏手术的数据，我发现了阻碍进入的投资的证据。这些发现表明，竞争动机在治疗决策中起作用。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号