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A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SOFTWARE PROTECTION: COMMENT

机译：软件保护的策略性方法：评论

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Economists increasingly have become interested in the economics of copyright and the distribution of digital products; for a recent overview see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003). In this context network effects may explain why firms do not enforce maximal copyright protections, as has been recognized by Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Takeyama (1994). In an important paper, Shy and Thisse (1999), hereafter, short ST extend the analysis to a model with strategic interaction. In their specification there are two types of consumers: one type who has a strong preference for originals (call them the high-value guys) and another type who is indifferent whether the good is an original or a copy (call them the low-value guys). Both types of consumers are distributed in a Retelling fashion between the two firms. Parameter restrictions are introduced that ensure that firms never compete for the low-value guys. Under copy protection, there exist up to two types of symmetric equilibria: one in which both firms price low so as to sell the good also to some low-value guys, and the other in which both firms set price so as to sell only to the high-value guys. Selling to high-value guys only is an equilibrium for sufficiently weak network effects. Selling also to some low-value guys is an equilibrium for sufficiently strong network effects. With copying, firms can exploit the positive network effects without selling to low-value guys. Suppose network effects are weak; then the number of sold units is not affected by the copy-protection policy. However, there is a price-competition effect that leads to a downward pressure of prices. Consequently, profits fall. Suppose, on the contrary, that network effects are strong. To exploit some of these network effects firms have to price low if no copying is available. But if copying freely is available, they can concentrate on high-value consumers and still can reap the benefits from network effects. This leads to higher prices and profits. Unfortunately, their Lemma 1 is wrong. Since the rest of the analysis is based on this lemma, it seems important to verify that the authors' claims still are correct, which is shown in this comment.
机译：经济学家对版权经济学和数字产品的发行越来越感兴趣。有关最近的概述，请参见Peitz和Waelbroeck（2003）。在这种情况下，网络效应可以解释为什么企业不执行最大的版权保护，正如Conner和Rumelt（1991）和Takeyama（1994）所认识的那样。此后，Shy and Thisse（1999）在一篇重要论文中，简称ST将分析扩展到具有战略互动的模型。在其规格中，有两种类型的消费者：一种对原始商品有强烈偏好的消费者（称他们为高价值人士），另一种对商品是原始商品还是复制品不感兴趣的消费者（称他们为低价值消费者）。伙计们）。两种类型的消费者都以复述方式在两家公司之间分配。引入了参数限制，以确保公司永远不会竞争低价值的人。在复制保护下，存在多达两种类型的对称均衡：一种是两家公司都以低价出售商品，同时也将商品卖给一些低价值的人；另一种是两种公司都以价格定价，以便只卖给高价值的人。仅向高价值的人出售是平衡网络效应的平衡。同时向一些低价值的人出售也可以平衡网络效应。通过复制，公司可以利用积极的网络效应而无需出售给低价值的人。假设网络效应很弱；则售出的单位数不受复制保护政策的影响。但是，存在价格竞争效应，导致价格下降的压力。结果，利润下降。相反，假设网络效应很强。要利用其中的一些网络效应，如果没有复制品，企业必须将价格定得较低。但是，如果可以自由复制，他们就可以专注于高价值的消费者，并且仍然可以从网络效应中获得收益。这导致更高的价格和利润。不幸的是，他们的引理1是错误的。由于其余的分析都是基于这个引理，因此验证作者的主张仍然是正确的似乎很重要，这在本评论中可以看出。

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