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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economics >Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing
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Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing

机译：无承诺任期审计的多罚系统中的动态激励合同

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摘要

This paper generalizes Khalil's (1997) static model to a multiperiod one in the tenure-track auditing. Three penalty systems considered are full-transfer-dependent, partial-transfer-dependent, and transfer-independent ones. It is found that the equilibrium under the tenure-track auditing is also an equilibrium under the periodic auditing. The conditions under which the principal prefers the periodic auditing, or is indifferent between the two auditing schemes are derived. Incentive contracts may vary in different penalty systems. For instance, the equilibrium with principal’s sure ex post auditing exists only under the partial-transfer-dependent and transfer-independent penalty systems. And the equilibrium with the first-best contract as the first-period optimum appears merely under the transfer-independent penalty system.
机译：本文将终身制审计中的Khalil（1997）静态模型推广到一个多周期模型。所考虑的三种惩罚系统是完全转移依赖的，部分转移依赖的和非转移依赖的。研究发现，权属跟踪审计下的均衡也是周期性审计下的均衡。得出委托人偏爱定期审核或两种审核方案之间无差异的条件。激励合同可能在不同的罚款制度中有所不同。例如，委托人必须确保事后审计的平衡仅存在于部分转移相关和独立于转移的惩罚制度下。而且，仅在与转移无关的惩罚系统下，以第一最佳合约为第一最佳最优的均衡出现。

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