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Political Risk Management in Light of Venezuela's Partial Nationalisation of the Oilfield Services Sector

机译:委内瑞拉对油田服务业部分国有化的政治风险管理

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During the 1990s, the Venezuelan Government introduced a policy known as the apertura petrolera (oil opening) and invited foreign private companies to invest in and enhance Venezuela's oil production infrastructure. Following the recent rise of resource nationalism and the dismantling of the apertura petrolera policies, Venezuela has nationalised the assets and operations of many oilfield service companies providing critical oil services to Petrdleos de Venezuela, SA or its affiliates. This move begs the question: to what extent, if at all, do risk management tools actually measure political risk and control it once the oil service contract comes under pressure? Although risk management may not be sufficient to thwart state interference, this article outlines the contractual and non-contractual risk assessment and risk management tools that are available to minimise risk when entering into oil service contracts with states, state agencies or state-owned entities. Following a brief introduction, this article highlights the main risks that oil service companies may face as a result of deliberate state action, with particular attention to the case of Venezuela. It next provides contractual and non-contractual risk management tools available to mitigate or transfer such risks, and then recounts the road to (partial) nationalisation of Venezuela's oilfield services sector. The article concludes that the complex interaction between state sovereignty and investors' property and contractual rights demands careful investment planning and skilful contract drafting to maximise investment protection in the host country.
机译:在1990年代,委内瑞拉政府出台了一项称为apertura汽油(开油)的政策,并邀请外国私人公司投资和改善委内瑞拉的石油生产基础设施。随着资源民族主义的兴起和废除apertura汽油政策,委内瑞拉已将许多向委内瑞拉石油公司(Petrdleos de Venezuela,SA)或其附属公司提供关键石油服务的油田服务公司的资产和业务国有化。这一举动引出了一个问题:一旦石油服务合同受到压力,风险管理工具在多大程度上(如果有的话)实际上能衡量政治风险并加以控制?尽管风险管理可能不足以阻止国家干预,但本文概述了合同和非合同风险评估以及风险管理工具,这些工具可用于在与州,州机构或国有实体签订石油服务合同时最大程度地降低风险。在简要介绍之后,本文重点介绍了石油服务公司由于国家蓄意采取行动而可能面临的主要风险,并特别关注委内瑞拉的情况。接下来,它提供了可用于减轻或转移此类风险的合同和非合同风险管理工具,然后介绍了委内瑞拉油田服务部门(部分)国有化的道路。文章得出的结论是,国家主权与投资者的财产和合同权利之间复杂的相互作用需要精心的投资计划和熟练的合同起草,以最大程度地在东道国保护投资。

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