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Audit error

机译:审核错误

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摘要

We study a setting in which a manager can exaggerate the observed measure of his performance, e.g., engage in window dressing or adopt unusually aggressive accounting. To limit such behavior, the firm's owner can adopt an accounting system that is less prone to manipulation. However, such a system also reduces the information content of the observed performance measure. We identify conditions under which the firm's owner will intentionally adopt an accounting system that admits self-interested manipulation by the manager in order to secure a more informative performance measure.
机译:我们研究了一种环境,在这种环境下,经理可以夸大观察到的绩效指标,例如从事橱窗装饰或采用异常激进的会计方法。为了限制这种行为,公司的所有者可以采用不太容易被操纵的会计系统。但是,这样的系统也减少了所观察到的性能指标的信息内容。我们确定了企业所有者有意采用一种会计制度的条件,该会计制度允许经理人进行自利操作,以确保获得更有益的绩效指标。

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