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State Aid and the Banking System in the Financial Crisis: From Bail-out to Bail-in

机译:金融危机中的国家援助和银行体系:从纾困到纾困

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摘要

Thus, according to both the AG and the ECJ, except for cases where the BRRD apply - and where measures of bail-in must be enforced, irrespective of the existence of an aid -, in cases where only State aid rules apply (such as precautionary recapitalisations) Member States remain free to notify State aid measures to banks even if they do not meet all the requirements provided by the 2013 Banking Communication, including the application of burden-sharing to subordinated creditors. As already said, national government will have to justify the inapplicability of the 2013 Banking Communication to the case at stake, and consequently the Commission will be under a duty to verify the correctness of the Member State's assumptions. Put it differently, if a Member State were able to prove that the bail-in should not apply to subordinate debts in the case at issue - for example because it would have caused disproportionate adverse effects on those creditors -, the Commission would be obliged to assess the compatibility of the aid granted by the State to a bank with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, thus outside the framework of the 2013 Banking Communication, and in the light of the general principle of proportionality.
机译:因此,根据美国公司和欧洲法院的说法,除了适用BRRD的情况以及必须采用保释措施,而不论是否存在援助的情况除外,在仅适用国家援助规则的情况下(例如预防性注资)成员国仍可自由通知国家对银行的援助措施,即使它们不符合2013年《银行通函》规定的所有要求,包括对次级债权人实行分担负担。如前所述,国家政府将必须证明2013年银行通讯不适合该案件,因此,委员会有责任核实成员国假设的正确性。换句话说,如果一个成员国能够证明保释金不适用于所涉案件的次级债务(例如,因为这将对那些债权人造成不成比例的不利影响),则委员会有义务评估国家授予银行的援助与TFEU第107(3)(b)条的兼容性,因此不在2013年《银行通函》的框架之内,并根据一般相称原则进行。

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