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Pricing routines and industrial dynamics

机译：定价惯例和工业动态

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We propose an evolutionary model in which boundedly rational firms compete and learn in a dynamic oligopoly with imperfect information and evolving degrees of market power. Firms in the model set prices according to routines, and try to make profits by capturing market share. The model can be extended to deal with heterogeneous costs and technological advance. The demand side of the market is composed of boundedly rational consumers who are capable of adapting to changing market options. Supply-demand interactions can be represented through a population dynamics model from which prices and market structures emerge. We obtain closed-form and simulation results which we interpret and compare with benchmark results from a standard non-cooperative game (Bertrand). When we compare the results with the Bertrand setting, we find a surprising result. Whereas in the fully rational Bertrand setting, firms either lower prices and erode their extra profits, or try to cooperate in a collusive equilibrium that is detrimental for consumer welfare, in the evolutionary setting firms make substantial profits, compete by adjusting prices, and the dynamics improve consumer welfare. From these results we claim that, instead of treating market power, externalities, and asymmetric information as market failures, we should consider them as essential traits of market competition. We argue that neo-Schumpeterian models incorporate all of these features together, thus leading towards a more realistic price theory for market economies.
机译：我们提出了一种进化模型，其中有限的理性公司在具有不完美信息和不断发展的市场力量的动态寡头垄断中竞争和学习。根据惯例，模型中的模型设定价格，并尝试通过捕获市场份额来赚取利润。该模型可以扩展到处理异质成本和技术进步。市场的需求方面由有信任的理性消费者组成，他们能够适应改变市场选择。供需相互作用可以通过从中出现价格和市场结构的人口动态模型来表示。我们获得了封闭式和仿真结果，我们将与标准非合作游戏（Bertrand）的基准结果进行解释和比较。当我们将结果与Bertrand设置进行比较时，我们发现了一个令人惊讶的结果。鉴于完全理性的Bertrand设置，公司要么兑现价格，要么削弱他们的额外利润，或者尝试在对消费者福利有害的宽敞性均衡中，在进化的环境中取得大量利润，通过调整价格进行竞争和动态改善消费者福利。从这些结果来看，我们声称，而不是将市场力量，外部性和不对称信息视为市场故障，而是应将其视为市场竞争的基本特征。我们认为，新舍洛特类模型将所有这些特征纳入其中，从而导致更现实的市场经济价格理论。

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