Public Thrift, Private Perks: Signaling Board Independence with Executive Pay

Ruiz-Verdu Pablo; Singh Ravi

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Public Thrift, Private Perks: Signaling Board Independence with Executive Pay

机译：公共节俭，私营津贴：信号委员会独立与高管薪酬

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We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager-friendly boards to use hidden pay or to distort incentive contracts. Stronger reputational pressures lead to lower disclosed pay, weaker managerial incentives, and higher hidden pay, whereas greater transparency of executive compensation has the opposite effects. Although reputational concerns can induce boards to choose compensation contracts more favorable to shareholders, we show that there is a threshold beyond which stronger reputational concerns harm shareholders. Similarly, excessive pay transparency can harm shareholders.

机译：我们分析董事会的声誉问题如何影响执行赔偿和隐藏工资的使用。独立董事会减少披露的薪酬以证明其独立性，但更有可能比经理友好董事会使用隐藏的工资或扭曲激励合同。更强大的声控导致透露薪酬降低，管理激励较弱，较高的隐藏工资，而高管赔偿的透明度具有相反的效果。虽然声誉令人担忧会诱导董事会选择股东更有利的赔偿合约，但我们表明，超出了更强的声誉危害股东的门槛。同样，过度薪酬透明度可以危害股东。

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来源
《Journal of Finance》 |2021年第2期|845-891|共47页
作者
Ruiz-Verdu Pablo; Singh Ravi;
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Univ Carlos III Madrid Dept Business Adm Calle Madrid 126 Madrid 28903 Spain;

Higher Moment Capital LP Boston MA USA;

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Public Thrift, Private Perks: Signaling Board Independence with Executive Pay

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