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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Finance >When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments
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When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders: The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments

机译：当金融机构是大股东时：宏观公司治理环境的作用

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摘要

While financial institutions' aggregate investments have grown substantially worldwide, the size of their individual shareholdings, and ultimately their incentive to monitor, may be limited by the free-rider problem, regulations, and a preference for diversification and liquidity. We compare institutions' shareholding patterns across countries and find vast differences in the extent to which they are large shareholders. These variations are largely determined by macro corporate governance factors such as shareholder protection, law enforcement, and corporate disclosure requirements. This suggests that strong governance environments act to strengthen monitoring ability such that more institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated equity positions.
机译：尽管全球范围内金融机构的总投资已大幅增长，但其个人持股的规模以及最终进行监管的动机可能会受到搭便车问题，法规以及对多元化和流动性的偏好的限制。我们比较了各国机构的持股方式，发现它们在大股东程度上的巨大差异。这些变化很大程度上取决于宏观公司治理因素，例如股东保护，执法和公司披露要求。这表明强大的治理环境可增强监控能力，从而鼓励更多机构持有集中的股权头寸。

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