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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market
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Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market

机译：柠檬先卖吗？抵押市场中的动态信号

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摘要

A central result in the theory of adverse selection in asset markets is that informed sellers can signal quality and obtain higher prices by delaying trade. This paper provides some of the first evidence of a signaling mechanism through trade delays using the residential mortgage market as a laboratory. We find a strong relationship between mortgage performance and time to sale for privately securitized mortgages. Additionally, deals made up of more seasoned mortgages are sold at lower yields. These effects are strongest in the "Alt-A" segment of the market, where mortgages are often sold with incomplete hard information, and in cases where the originator and the issuer of mortgage-backed securities are not affiliated. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：资产市场逆向选择理论的主要结果是，知情的卖方可以通过延迟交易来发出质量信号并获得更高的价格。本文提供了一些使用住宅抵押贷款市场作为实验室通过贸易延迟产生信号机制的初步证据。我们发现抵押贷款表现与私人证券化抵押贷款的销售时间之间存在很强的关系。此外，由经验更丰富的抵押贷款构成的交易以较低的收益率出售。这些影响在“ Alt-A”市场中最为明显，在该市场中，抵押贷款经常以不完整的硬信息出售，并且抵押贷款支持证券的发起者和发行者之间没有关联。 （C）2018 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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