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Trade credit and supplier competition

机译：贸易信贷与供应商竞争

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This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer's purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model's predictions and are statistically and economically significant. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：本文研究了供应商之间的竞争如何影响他们提供贸易信贷融资的意愿。供应商向现金受限的零售商提供的贸易信贷使后者可以增加从其他供应商处购买现金的机会，从而导致搭便车问题。占零售商购买份额较小的供应商将零售商增加支出的收益内在化，并因此相对于其销售减少了贸易信贷。因此，供应商分散的零售商所获得的贸易信贷要少于其供应商更加集中的零售商。当搭便车的供应商是其产品市场竞争者时，搭便车的问题尤其不利于贸易债权人，从而导致供应商对给定零售商的产品替代性与前者提供给后者的贸易信贷之间存在负相关关系。我们使用模拟和真实数据测试模型。估计的关系与模型的预测一致，并且在统计和经济上均具有重要意义。 （C）2018 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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