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Regulating a model

机译:调节模型

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摘要

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank's private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们研究了一种情况,在这种情况下,监管机构依赖银行产生的风险模型来进行监管。银行可以生成多个模型,并选择向监管机构披露的模型。监管机构可以通过监视银行来找到其他模型,但是在平衡状态下,监视会导致银行产生较少的信息。我们表明,当银行从产生更多信息中获得的私人收益足够高或足够低时,就需要进行高度监视。当公共模型更加精确时,银行会提供更多信息,但监管机构最终可能会进行更多监控。 (C)2018 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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