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The effect of bank monitoring on public bond terms

机译：银行监管对公共债券条款的影响

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This study examines the effect of bank loan monitoring on public bond contract design. We find that bond yield spreads are lower and that bond issuance amounts are larger when a borrower has recently obtained a private loan, consistent with bond issuers benefiting from the screening and ongoing monitoring of banks. We find that these bonds include more covenants than bonds issued without the cross-monitoring of banks, consistent with bondholders wanting to protect themselves from private lenders. This effect is larger for firms with high information asymmetry and larger potential conflicts between different lender types. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Overall, our empirical results suggest that borrowers that precede their public bond issuances with private loan agreements receive more favorable bond terms. Meanwhile, these benefits are associated with the cost of increased monitoring by public bonds. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：本研究探讨了银行贷款监控对公共债券合同设计的影响。我们发现，当借款人最近获得私人贷款时，债券收益率利差较低，债券发行量较大，这与债券发行人受益于对银行的筛选和持续监控有关。我们发现，与没有银行交叉监控的债券相比，这些债券所包含的契约更多，这与希望保护自己免受私人贷方侵害的债券持有人一致。对于信息高度不对称且不同贷方类型之间潜在冲突较大的公司，此影响更大。我们的结果对于一系列的灵敏度测试是可靠的。总体而言，我们的经验结果表明，在公共债券发行之前签署私人贷款协议的借款人会获得更优惠的债券条款。同时，这些好处与增加公共债券监管的成本有关。 （C）2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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