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Regulating a model

机译:调节模型

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摘要

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank's private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们研究了监管机构依赖银行生产以规范它们的风险模型的情况。银行可以生成多种型号,并选择哪种型号透露给监管机构。监管机构可以通过监控银行来了解其他模型,但在均衡中,监测诱导银行产生更少的信息。我们表明,当银行生产更多信息的私人收益是足够高或足够低的时,期待高水平的监测是可取的。当公共模型更准确时,银行会产生更多信息,但监管机构可能最终监控更多信息。 (c)2018年elestvier b.v.保留所有权利。

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