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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting
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The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting

机译：动态重新协商和信息不对称在金融承包中的作用

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Using data from Securities and Exchange Commission filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers' credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：使用美国证券交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission）备案的数据，我发现典型的银行贷款每5个月或每9个月重新谈判一次。在每次重新谈判期间，价格，到期日，金额和契约都将进行重大修改，其时间安排取决于缔约双方的财务状况以及借款人信用质量的不确定性。这些因素的相对重要性取决于贷款关系的持续时间。我根据金融合同理论来解释这些结果，并强调重新谈判是动态完成合同和事后分配控制权的重要机制。 （C）2014 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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