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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
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Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

机译：独立董事的责任：来自公司的证券诉讼证据

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摘要

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for Financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors' ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.
机译：我们研究了当投资者起诉公司进行财务和与披露相关的欺诈行为时，哪些独立董事应负责。投资者可以在诉讼中将独立董事指定为被告，并且他们可以投票反对独立董事，以表达对董事在监督管理人员方面无能为力的不满。在1996年至2010年的证券集体诉讼案件中，约11％的独立董事被称为被告。上课期间出售股票的审计委员会成员和董事被提名的可能性更大。委任董事咨询机构机构股东服务获得了更多的负面建议，而基准样本中的股东所获得的否决票则明显多于董事。他们也比其他独立董事更有可能离开被起诉的公司。总体而言，当公司遭受财务欺诈时，股东会通过诉讼，董事选举和董事保留来使某些独立董事承担更多的责任。

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