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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power
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The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power

机译：理想的选举学院投票机制与股东权力

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Increasing concern over corporate governance has led to calls for more shareholder influence over corporate decisions, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues may not affect the quality of governance. We should expect instead that, under current rules, shareholder voting will implement the preferences of the majority of large shareholders and management. This is because majority rule offers little incentive for small shareholders to vote. I offer a potential remedy in the form of a new voting rule, the Idealized Electoral College (IEC), modeled on the American Electoral College, that significantly increases the expected impact that a given shareholder has on election. The benefit of the mechanism is that it induces greater turnout, but the cost is that it sometimes assigns a winner that is not preferred by a majority of voters. Therefore, for issues on which management and small shareholders are likely to disagree, the IEC is superior to majority rule.
机译：对公司治理的日益关注已导致要求更大的股东对公司决策的影响力，但允许股东对更多问题进行投票可能不会影响公司治理的质量。相反，我们应该期望在当前规则下，股东投票将实现大多数大股东和管理层的偏好。这是因为多数制规则几乎没有激励小股东投票。我以美国选举学院为模型，以一种新的投票规则，即理想化选举学院（IEC）的形式提供了一种可能的补救方法，该选举规则显着提高了给定股东对选举产生的预期影响。该机制的好处在于，它可以增加投票率，但代价是，它有时会分配一个多数选民不喜欢的获胜者。因此，对于管理层和小股东可能不同意的问题，IEC优于多数人规则。

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