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Nonlinear incentives and mortgage officers' decisions

机译：非线性激励和抵押贷款人的决定

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摘要

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, banks should ensure that their incentive compensation policies appropriately balance long-term risk with short-term rewards. Using daily output data from mortgage officers in a US commercial bank, we test the notion that nonlinear contracts create time-varying incentives for the employees and impose costs on the firm. We provide empirical evidence that mortgage officers greatly increase their output toward the end of each month, when the minimum monthly quota is assessed. This occurs through a combination of reducing the processing time and approving some marginal applications. We also find that mortgages originated on the last working day of the month have a higher likelihood of delinquency.
机译：在最近的金融危机之后，银行应确保其激励性补偿政策适当平衡长期风险与短期收益。利用美国一家商业银行抵押贷款官员的每日输出数据，我们测试了非线性合同为员工创造时变激励并给公司带来成本的观念。我们提供的经验证据表明，在评估每月最低配额时，抵押贷款官员会在每个月末大幅增加其产出。这是通过减少处理时间和批准一些边际申请的组合来实现的。我们还发现，源自本月最后一个工作日的抵押贷款有更大的拖欠可能性。

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