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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Alliances and corporate governance☆
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Alliances and corporate governance☆

机译：联盟与公司治理☆

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摘要

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company' Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects ("longshots") or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An "experiment" that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.
机译：我们研究了公司治理质量与其联盟活动之间的联系。我们将联盟视为一项承诺技术，可帮助公司首席执行官克服与无法事先激励部门经理有关的代理问题。我们表明，管理完善的公司更有可能利用这项技术来预测事后承诺问题并加以解决。当承诺问题更加尖锐时，例如对于具有高风险/长期风险的项目（“长期目标”）或更容易导致内部资源重新分配效率低下的公司（企业集团），以及在没有这种情况下，治理的作用尤其重要。替代纪律设备（例如，较低的产品市场竞争）。治理还减轻了联盟伙伴之间的代理问题；优势联盟伙伴同意与治理更好的初级伙伴更平等地分配权力。导致联盟承诺技术成本发生横截面变化的“实验”提供了治理与联盟之间因果关系的证据。

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