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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Contracting under asymmetric information: Evidence from lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings
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Contracting under asymmetric information: Evidence from lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings

机译:不对称信息下的契约:来自经验丰富的股票发行中的锁定协议的证据

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摘要

We document the frequent use of lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and examine the determinants of their use, duration, and early release. We find that the likelihood of an SEO lockup and its duration are positively related to issuer information asymmetry measures. Lockup duration is negatively related to underwriter spreads and underpricing, indicating that lockups lower expected flotation costs. Lockups are frequently released early following share prices rises. We conclude that lockups represent a contracting solution to asymmetric information and agency problems that plague equity issues by helping to insure SEO quality and deter opportunistic insider trading.
机译:我们记录了经验丰富的股票发行(SEO)中频繁使用锁定协议的情况,并研究了其使用,期限和提前发布的决定因素。我们发现SEO锁定的可能性及其持续时间与发行人信息不对称性度量呈正相关。锁定期与承销商的价差和定价偏低负相关,表明锁定期降低了预期的发行成本。股价上涨后经常会提前释放锁定信息。我们得出的结论是,锁定是解决不对称信息和代理问题的一种契约式解决方案,该问题通过帮助确保SEO质量并阻止机会主义内幕交易而困扰着股权问题。

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