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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting
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The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting

机译：公司发起的回扣条款对银行贷款签约的影响

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摘要

Although firm-initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation, they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities (e.g., reduce research and development (R&D) expenses) to achieve earnings targets. To assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions, we examine their impact from debtholders' point of view. We find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption. Taken together, our findings indicate that firm-initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face.
机译：尽管公司发起的回扣减少了对会计的操纵，但它们也诱使管理人员从事次优的活动（例如，减少研发费用）以实现收益目标。为了评估回扣条款的有效性，我们从债务持有人的角度检查了其影响。我们发现，银行在贷款合同中使用更多的财务契约和绩效定价条款，并在企业发起回扣后降低利率。此外，我们还发现，采用回扣制后，贷款期限增加，贷款抵押品减少。综上所述，我们的发现表明，公司发起的回扣条款可以提高财务报告的质量，从而减少融资提供商所面临的信息不确定性。

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