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Board structure and price informativeness

机译:董事会结构和价格信息

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摘要

We develop and test the hypothesis that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate boards. We find a negative relation between price informative-ness and board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls, including firm fixed effects, and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness. Consistent with the hypothesis that price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes, this relation is particularly strong for firms more exposed to both external and internal governance mechanisms and for firms in which firm-specific knowledge is relatively unimportant. Our results suggest that firms with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures.
机译:我们开发并检验了股票价格信息会影响公司董事会结构的假设。我们发现价格信息和董事会独立性之间存在负相关关系。这一发现对于包括许多公司级控制(包括公司固定效应)以及选择价格信息性的度量是有力的。与价格信息和董事会监督是替代品的假设相一致,这种关系对于那些更受外部和内部治理机制影响的公司,以及对于公司特定知识而言相对不重要的公司,尤其重要。我们的结果表明,具有更多信息股价的公司的董事会结构要求较低。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of financial economics》 |2011年第3期|p.523-545|共23页
  • 作者单位

    London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK European Corporate Governance Institute, 1780 Brussels, Belgium Centre for Economic Policy Research, London EC1V 0DG, UK;

    Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal European Corporate Governance Institute, 1780 Brussels, Belgium;

    Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, 1200-781 Lisbon, Portugal;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    corporate boards; independent directors; price informativeness; monitoring; takeovers;

    机译:公司董事会;独立董事;价格信息;监控;接管;

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