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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds
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When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

机译：公司何时应与员工分享信用？来自匿名管理的共同基金的证据

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摘要

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.
机译：我们研究了在命名和匿名共同基金经理之间的选择。我们认为，基金家族会权衡任命经理人的利益和与其未来议价能力提高相关的成本。由于内部交叉补贴，指定经理人受到更多的媒体关注，流入量更大，收益减少，但由于任命经理人的离职减少了净流量。在1993年至2004年之间，经理人的命名变得不那么普遍了。在受对冲基金热潮影响最大的资产类别和城市中，这种情况尤为明显，因为这增加了获得成功任命的经理人的外部机会和保留成本。

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