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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial economics >Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry
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Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

机译：就业风险，薪酬激励措施和管理风险承担：来自共同基金行业的证据

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摘要

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.
机译：我们研究了由于就业风险和薪酬对激励措施对管理风险承担的影响。我们对共同基金经理的冒险行为的实证研究表明，管理风险承担关键取决于这些激励措施的相对重要性。当就业风险比薪酬激励措施更为重要时，年中表现不佳的基金经理往往会比首席经理降低风险，以防止潜在的工作机会流失。当就业风险较低时，薪酬激励措施就变得更加重要，而年中表现不佳的基金经理人则增加了赶上年中赢家的风险。

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  • 来源
    《Journal of financial economics》 |2009年第1期|92-108|共17页
  • 作者

    Alexander Kempf; Stefan Ruenzi; Tanja Thiele;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Finance, University of Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany;

    Department of Finance, University of Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA;

    Department of Finance, University of Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany Centre for Financial Research (CFR) Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 关键词

    managerial risk taking; employment risk; compensation incentives; mutual funds; restrictions;

    机译：管理风险承担;就业风险;补偿激励;共同基金;限制条件;

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