首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance >Banks, knowledge and crisis: a case of knowledge and learning failure
【24h】

Banks, knowledge and crisis: a case of knowledge and learning failure

机译:银行,知识与危机:知识与学习失败的案例

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Purpose – Regulators such as Turner have identified excessive securitization, high leverage, extensive market trading and a bonus culture, as being major factors in bringing about the bank centred financial crisis of 2007-2009. Whilst it is inevitable that banks adopt procyclical business strategies, not all banks took excessive risks and subsequently had to be rescued by taxpayers. The paper examines the extent to which individual bank outcomes can be attributed to systematic differences in banking knowledge concerning the primary risks and value drivers of their organisations by bank board directors and top management. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews a wide range of theoretical, historical and empirical literatures on banking models and detailed case analyses of failing and non-failing banks. A framework for understanding the role and application of knowledge in banking is developed which suggests how banks, despite their pro-cyclical business strategies, are able to institutionalise learning and actively create new knowledge through time to improve bank organisation, intermediation and risk management. Findings – The paper finds that a lack of basic knowledge of banking risks and value drivers by the boards and senior managers of the failing banks were implicated in the banking crisis. These knowledge problems concerned banks' understanding of their organisation, intermediation and risk management in an active market setting characterised by rapid economic and organisational change. Thus, the failing banks ignored or were unaware of this knowledge and hence experienced acute difficulties with learning the new knowledge needed to address the new problems thrown-up by the financial crisis. Practical implications – The analysis suggests that addressing this knowledge gap via the institutionalisation of banking knowledge ought to constitute an important element of any sustainable solution to the problems currently being experienced by the banking sector. By ensuring greater bank learning, knowledge creation, and knowledge use, governments and regulators could help reduce individual bank risk and the likelihood of future crisis. Originality/value – In contrast to the claims made by some politicians and banking insiders, the analysis indicates that the banking crisis and its severity were neither unpredictable nor unavoidable since some banks, by institutionalising banking knowledge and history of past crises, successfully avoided the pitfalls experienced by the failing banks.
机译:目的–特纳等监管机构已将过度证券化,高杠杆率,广泛的市场交易和红利文化视为导致2007-2009年以银行为中心的金融危机的主要因素。尽管银行不可避免地采取顺周期性的业务策略,但并非所有银行都承担了过多的风险,因此不得不由纳税人解救。本文研究了银行董事会董事和高层管理人员可在多大程度上归因于银行知识在系统上有关其组织的主要风险和价值驱动因素的系统差异。设计/方法/方法–本文回顾了有关银行业模型的大量理论,历史和经验文献,并对失败和不失败的银行进行了详细的案例分析。建立了一个理解知识在银行业中的作用和应用的框架,该框架表明尽管采取了周期性的商业策略,银行如何能够将学习制度化并通过时间积极地创造新知识,以改善银行的组织,中介和风险管理。调查结果–该论文发现,破产银行的董事会和高级管理人员缺乏银行业风险的基本知识和价值驱动因素,这与银行业危机有关。这些知识问题关系到银行在以迅速的经济和组织变革为特征的活跃市场环境中对其组织,中介和风险管理的理解。因此,破产的银行忽视或不了解这一知识,因此在学习解决金融危机引发的新问题所需的新知识时遇到了严重的困难。实际意义–分析表明,通过银行业知识的制度化来解决这一知识鸿沟,应构成任何可持续解决银行业目前所面临问题的重要因素。通过确保更多的银行学习,知识创造和知识使用,政府和监管机构可以帮助降低个人银行风险和未来危机的可能性。原创性/价值–与一些政治家和银行内部人士的主张相反,分析表明,银行危机及其严重程度既不是不可预测的,也不是不可避免的,因为一些银行通过将银行知识和过去危机的历史制度化,成功地避免了陷阱破产银行的经验。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号