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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance >Special bank resolution and shareholders' rights: balancing competing interests
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Special bank resolution and shareholders' rights: balancing competing interests

机译：银行特别决议案和股东权益：平衡利益冲突

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Purpose – An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a number of legal issues with respect to the rights of shareholders. This paper aims to consider how to strike a balance between the need to protect the legitimate rights of shareholders and the need for a prompt and rapid action and a failure resolution mechanism that minimizes disruptions to the financial system and preserves market discipline. Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the nature of the shareholders' rights and the legal protection afforded to them. In the European context, the relevant sources of law are the European Convention on Human Rights and the applicable community legislation. It considers different options for resolution within this framework ranging from a pre-packaged resolution decided by the shareholders ex ante to the outright divestiture of the shareholders once certain regulatory thresholds are breached while the bank still has positive net worth. Findings – The curtailment of shareholder rights should seek to generate appropriate incentives for shareholders and other stakeholder and achieve broad objectives of enhancing predictability and maintaining public goods, while at the same time providing for due process, proportionality and adequate compensation. Practical implications – The paper presents options on how to reform existing frameworks in order to facilitate bank restructurings in a crisis. Originality/value – The paper discusses key elements that policy makers need to consider in the design of a regulatory framework for early intervention and resolution.
机译：目的–有效的银行解决方案制度需要采取行动，同时银行仍需拥有正净值，股东索赔仍具有经济价值。这种行为在股东权利方面引起了许多法律问题。本文旨在考虑如何在保护股东合法权利的需要与采取迅速，迅速行动的需要之间建立平衡，并采取一种能够最大限度地减少对金融系统的破坏并保持市场纪律的失败解决机制。设计/方法/方法-本文研究了股东权利的性质和给予股东的法律保护。在欧洲，相关的法律渊源是《欧洲人权公约》和适用的社区立法。它考虑了在该框架内解决方案的不同选择，从事前由股东决定的预先打包的决议到一旦违反某些监管标准而银行仍然拥有正净资产时就直接剥离股东。调查结果–削减股东权利应寻求对股东和其他利益相关者产生适当的激励，并实现提高可预测性和维护公共物品的广泛目标，同时提供正当程序，相称性和适当的补偿。实际意义–本文提出了有关如何改革现有框架以在危机中促进银行重组的选择。原创性/价值–本文讨论了决策者在设计早期干预和解决方案的监管框架时需要考虑的关键要素。

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