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Regulation and information asymmetry: Evidence from the performance of industrial and utility firms issuing seasoned equity in the USA

机译:监管和信息不对称:来自工业和公用事业公司在美国发行经验丰富股权的业绩的证据

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Purpose – This paper seeks to examine the potential for regulation to reduce information asymmetries between firm insiders and outside investors. Design/methodology/approach – Extensive prior research has established that there are substantial effects of information asymmetry in seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The paper tests for a mitigating effect of regulation on such information asymmetries by examining differences in long-run operating performance, changes in that performance, and announcement-period stock returns between unregulated industrial firms and regulated utilities that issue seasoned equity. The authors also segment the samples by firm size, since smaller firms are likely to have greater asymmetries. Findings – Consistent with regulated utility firms having lower levels of information asymmetry, they have superior changes in abnormal operating performance than industrial firms pre- to post-issue and their announcement period returns are significantly less negative. These findings are most pronounced for the smallest firms, firms likely to have the greatest information asymmetries and where regulation could have its greatest effect. Research limitations/implications – The paper does not examine costs of regulation. Thus, future research could seek to measure the cost/benefit trade-off of regulation in reducing information asymmetry. Also, future research could examine cross-sectional differences between different industries and regulated utilities. Practical implications – Regulation reduces information asymmetry. Thus, regulation or mandated disclosure may be appropriate in industries/markets where information asymmetry is severe. Originality/value – This paper is the first to compare the operating performance of regulated and unregulated SEO firms.
机译:目的–本文旨在研究规制的潜力,以减少公司内部人员和外部投资者之间的信息不对称。设计/方法/方法–大量的先前研究已经确定,经验丰富的股权要约(SEO)中信息不对称会产生重大影响。本文通过检查长期运营绩效,绩效的变化以及未受监管的工业公司与发行经验丰富的受监管公用事业公司之间的公告期股票回报之间的差异,来测试监管对此类信息不对称的缓解作用。作者还按公司规模对样本进行了细分,因为较小的公司可能具有更大的不对称性。研究结果–与信息不对称程度较低的受管制公用事业公司一致,它们在异常经营业绩方面的变化要比发行前至发行后的工业公司更好,而且其公告期收益显着降低。这些发现对于规模最小的公司,信息不对称性最大的公司以及监管可能产生最大影响的公司最为明显。研究的局限性/意义–本文不探讨监管成本。因此,未来的研究可能会寻求在降低信息不对称性方面衡量监管成本/收益的权衡。此外,未来的研究可能会检查不同行业与受管制公用事业之间的横截面差异。实际意义–监管减少了信息不对称。因此,在信息不对称严重的行业/市场中,监管或强制性披露可能是适当的。原创性/价值–本文是第一个比较受监管和不受监管的SEO公司的运营绩效的方法。

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