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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of Financial Research >TARGET-MANAGEMENT-INVOLVED BUYOUTS: IMPACT ON TAKEOVER COMPETITION, LITIGATION RISK, AND SHAREHOLDER RETURNS
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TARGET-MANAGEMENT-INVOLVED BUYOUTS: IMPACT ON TAKEOVER COMPETITION, LITIGATION RISK, AND SHAREHOLDER RETURNS

机译：目标管理参与的收购：对收购竞争，诉讼风险和股东回报的影响

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摘要

We examine the impact of target management involvement as bidders in a sample of completed going-private buyouts. Announcement-period and long-run target shareholder returns do not appear to be lower in management-involved deals. We attempt to identify disciplining mechanisms in the takeover process that can explain this result. We find that target shareholder lawsuits are more likely when management is involved, and litigation risk appears to positively affect target returns. We also study a sample of withdrawn buyout deals and find that a significant number of management bids are unsuccessful, further suggesting that safeguards exist in management-involved deals.
机译：我们在完成的私有化收购示例中考察了作为投标人的目标管理人员参与的影响。在涉及管理层的交易中，公告期和长期目标股东回报似乎并不低。我们试图在收购过程中找出可以解释这一结果的纪律机制。我们发现，在涉及管理层的情况下，目标股东提起诉讼的可能性更高，诉讼风险似乎对目标收益产生积极影响。我们还研究了撤回的收购交易的样本，发现大量管理层竞标不成功，这进一步表明在涉及管理层的交易中存在保障措施。

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