...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of financial services research >Can Market Discipline Work in the Case of Rating Agencies? Some Lessons from Moody's Stock Price
【24h】

Can Market Discipline Work in the Case of Rating Agencies? Some Lessons from Moody's Stock Price

机译：在评级机构的情况下市场纪律能发挥作用吗？穆迪股价的一些教训

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper examines whether the stock price of the rating agency Moody's reacts negatively to rating actions that could indicate low rating quality. The reaction to rating reversals, which Moody's describes as particularly damaging to investors, is economically significant. It suggests that market discipline has the potential to influence agency behavior. On the other hand, defaults of highly rated issuers do not consistently impact Moody's stock price. The focus on reversals and the neglect of default events are consistent with either collusion or with misconceptions of how rating quality should be evaluated. Both interpretations question whether market discipline can be sufficient to ensure a socially optimal rating policy within the current environment.
机译：本文研究了评级机构穆迪（Moody's）的股价是否对可能表明评级质量低的评级行为做出了负面反应。穆迪形容对评级逆转的反应在经济上具有重大意义。这表明市场纪律有可能影响代理行为。另一方面，评级高的发行人的违约并不会持续影响穆迪的股价。对逆转的关注和对违约事件的忽视与勾结或对评估评级质量的误解相一致。两种解释都质疑市场纪律是否足以在当前环境下确保社会最优的评级政策。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号