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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules
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Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules

机译：替代支付规则下不可逆医疗保健投资的静态和动态效率

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The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, we calibrate the model to study a specific technology and estimate the cost of a regulatory failure.
机译：本文研究了当患者的利益不确定时，提供者在替代支付系统下投资于新医疗技术的动机。如果购买者的报销包括可变的（每位患者）和一次性总付，则可以确保采用时间（动态）和技术使用强度（静态）的效率。如果第二个工具不可用，则可能会在静态效率和动态效率之间进行权衡。在这种情况下，我们还讨论了监管机构如何利用对提供商所面临不确定性水平的控制作为减轻静态效率与动态效率之间权衡的工具。最后，我们校准模型以研究特定技术并估算监管失败的成本。

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