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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >Pricing behaviour of nonprofit insurers in a weakly competitive social health insurance market
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Pricing behaviour of nonprofit insurers in a weakly competitive social health insurance market

机译:竞争激烈的社会健康保险市场中非营利保险公司的定价行为

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摘要

In this paper we examine the pricing behaviour of nonprofit health insurers in the Dutch social health insurance market. Since for-profit insurers were not allowed in this market, potential spillover effects from the presence of for-profit insurers on the behaviour of nonprofit insurers were absent. Using a panel data set for all health insurers operating in the Dutch social health insurance market over the period 1996-2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour of nonprofit health insurers. We find that financial stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing behaviour. In the presence of weak price competition, health insurers did not set premiums to maximize profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that regulations on financial reserves are needed to restrict premiums.
机译:在本文中,我们研究了荷兰社会健康保险市场中非营利健康保险公司的定价行为。由于该市场不允许营利性保险人,因此不存在因营利性保险人的存在而对非营利性保险人的行为产生的潜在溢出效应。我们使用1996-2004年间在荷兰社会健康保险市场中运营的所有健康保险公司的面板数据集,估算了一种溢价模型,以确定哪些因素可以解释非营利性健康保险公司的价格设定行为。我们发现,财务稳定性而不是利润最大化为健康计划的定价行为提供了最好的解释。在价格竞争疲软的情况下,医疗保险公司没有设定保费来最大化利润。然而,我们的发现表明,需要有关于金融准备金的法规来限制保费。

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