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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour—An experimental investigation
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How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour—An experimental investigation

机译：支付系统如何影响医师的提供行为—实验研究

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摘要

Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and capitation payments on physicians' supply of medical services. In our experiment, physicians choose quantities of medical services for patients with different states of health. We find that physicians provide significantly more services under fee-for-service than under capitation. Patients are overserved under fee-for-service and underserved under capitation. However, payment incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity choices, as patients' health benefits are of considerable importance as well. We find that patients in need of a high (low) level of medical services receive larger health benefits under fee-for-service (capitation).
机译：了解医生如何应对支付计划的激励措施是健康经济学研究的中心问题。我们引入了一个受控实验室实验，以分析按服务付费和按人头付费的激励措施对医生提供医疗服务的影响。在我们的实验中，医生为处于不同健康状态的患者选择大量的医疗服务。我们发现，与按人头收费相比，按服务收费医生提供的服务明显更多。收费服务给病人提供了过多服务，人头服务给病人提供了服务。然而，由于患者的健康利益也非常重要，因此，支付激励措施并不是医生选择数量的唯一动机。我们发现，需要高（低）医疗服务水平的患者在按需付费（人头费）下可以获得更大的健康利益。

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