...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >Optimal public rationing and price response
【24h】

Optimal public rationing and price response

机译：最佳的公共配给和价格响应

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity (defined as treatment cost). Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information (means testing). In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Rationing some poor consumers implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold (cost effectiveness). Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth.
机译：我们研究最佳的公共卫生保健配给和私营部门的价格响应。消费者的财富和疾病严重程度（定义为治疗费用）不同。由于预算有限，因此必须对某些消费者进行定量配给。合理的消费者可以从垄断的私人市场购买商品。我们考虑两种信息制度。首先，公共供应商根据消费者的财富信息对他们进行配给（均值测试）。为了达到均衡，公共供应者必须对富裕和贫穷的消费者进行定量分配。通过配给一些贫困消费者，可以降低私人市场的价格。在第二种信息体制中，公共供应商根据消费者的财富和成本信息对消费者进行配给。在均衡状态下，当且仅当其成本低于阈值（成本效益）时，才为消费者分配商品。基于成本的配给比基于财富的配给带来更高的均衡消费者剩余。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号