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Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market

机译:在竞争激烈的医院市场中信息不完善

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摘要

We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit-seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However, if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals. Moreover, even when quality increases, better information may increase or decrease patient welfare depending on whether an ex post or ex ante view of welfare is taken.
机译:我们研究了政策的含义,这些政策旨在改善有关利润相同的垄断性医院的质量信息,这些医院面临相同的管制价格并在质量上竞争。我们表明,如果医院的质量成本相近,那么更好的信息可以提高两家医院的质量。但是,如果费用差异很大,那么改进的信息将降低两家医院的质量。此外,即使质量提高了,更好的信息也可能增加或减少患者的福利,这取决于是否事后或事前考虑福利。

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