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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >Using performance measures to motivate 'report-averse' and 'report-loving' agents
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Using performance measures to motivate 'report-averse' and 'report-loving' agents

机译：使用绩效指标来激励“不喜欢报告”和“喜欢报告”的代理商

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摘要

In designing a quality report, a health plan needs to account for the report's effect on the doctor, hospital or other provider. This paper proposes a simple model of how quality reporting affects a health care provider, using the example of a doctor subject to reporting with a "cut point" that designates the doctor as above or below some standard. Choice of cut point affects the doctor's welfare through the doctor's preferences about income and by affecting market demand for the doctor's services. These factors lead doctors to be "report-averse" or "report-loving," a determination that affects a health plan's cost to enlist a doctor in a contract with reporting and that guides choice of a cut point to maximize the doctors' effort to improve her quality.
机译：在设计质量报告时，健康计划需要考虑该报告对医生，医院或其他提供者的影响。本文提出了一个简单的模型，以质量报告如何影响医疗保健提供者为例，以医生为例，该报告具有“临界点”，该阈值将医生指定为高于或低于某个标准。切入点的选择通过医生对收入的偏爱以及对医生服务的市场需求而影响医生的福利。这些因素导致医生“厌恶报告”或“偏爱报告”，这一决定会影响健康计划的费用，以使医生与报告签订合同，并指导选择切入点以最大程度地发挥医生的作用。提高她的素质。

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