首页> 外文期刊>Journal of health economics >Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums
【24h】

Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums

机译:激励兼容的可再生健康保险保费

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Theoretical models of guaranteed renewable insurance display front-loaded premium schedules. Such schedules both cover lifetime total claims of low-risk and high-risk individuals and provide an incentive for those who remain low-risk to continue to purchase the policy. Questions have been raised of whether actual individual insurance markets in the US approximate the behavior predicted by these models, both because young consumers may not be able to "afford" front-loading and because insurers may behave strategically in ways that erode the value of protection against risk reclassification. In this paper, the optimal competitive age-based premium schedule for a benchmark guaranteed renewable health insurance policy is estimated using medical expenditure data. Several factors are shown to reduce the amount of front-loading necessary. Indeed, the resulting optimal premium path increases with age. Actual premium paths exhibited by purchasers of individual insurance are close to the optimal renewable schedule we estimate. Finally, consumer utility associated with the feature is examined.
机译:保证可再生保险的理论模型显示了前期保费计划。此类计划既涵盖了低风险和高风险个人的终生总索赔额,又为仍然处于低风险状态的人们提供了继续购买该保单的动力。人们质疑美国的实际个人保险市场是否近似于这些模型所预测的行为,这既是因为年轻的消费者可能无法“负担得起”,又是因为保险公司的战略行为可能会削弱保护价值。反对风险重新分类。在本文中,使用医疗支出数据估算了基准可再生健康保险保单的基于竞争性年龄的最优保费时间表。已显示出多种因素可减少所需的前部装载量。实际上,最终的最优保费路径会随着年龄的增长而增加。个人保险购买者展示的实际保费路径接近我们估计的最佳可再生时间表。最后,检查与该功能关联的消费者效用。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号