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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of industrial and management optimization >IMPACT OF PRICE CAP REGULATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTING BETWEEN TWO MONOPOLISTS
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IMPACT OF PRICE CAP REGULATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTING BETWEEN TWO MONOPOLISTS

机译：价格上限规制对两个垄断者之间的供应链收缩的影响

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摘要

This paper considers a supply chain with an unregulated upstream monopolist (she) supplying a kind of products to a regulated downstream monopolist (he). The upstream monopolist's production efficiency, which represents her type, is only privately known to herself. When the downstream monopolist trades with the upstream monopolist, his pricing discretion is constrained by price cap regulation (PCR). We model this problem as a game of adverse selection with the price cap constraint. In this model, the downstream monopolist offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the transfer payment and the retail price. We show that private information can weaken PCR's impact on the optimal contract, and PCR can dampen the effects of private information. We also shed light on the influences of private information and PCR on the optimal contract, the downstream monopolist's profit, the upstream monopolist's profit, the consumers' surplus and the social total welfare, respectively. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the proposed results.
机译：本文考虑了一个供应链，该供应链具有不受监管的上游垄断者（她）向受监管的下游垄断者（他）供应一种产品。上游垄断者的生产效率（代表她的类型）仅是自己为人所知的。当下游垄断者与上游垄断者进行交易时，其定价自由度受价格上限规定（PCR）的约束。我们将此问题建模为带有价格上限约束的逆向选择游戏。在此模型中，下游垄断者提供了一个合同菜单，每个合同都包含两个参数：转移支付和零售价。我们表明，私人信息可以削弱PCR对最佳合同的影响，而PCR可以削弱私人信息的影响。我们还揭示了私人信息和PCR对最优合同，下游垄断者的利润，上游垄断者的利润，消费者剩余和社会总福利的影响。最后，给出一个数值例子来说明所提出的结果。

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