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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of industrial and management optimization >CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH RETAILER-COLLECTION UNDER LEGISLATION
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CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH RETAILER-COLLECTION UNDER LEGISLATION

机译：立法授权下具有零售商集合的闭环供应链网络均衡模型

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摘要

This paper examines the waste of electrical and electronic equipments (WEEE) and draws on variational inequalities to model the closed-loop supply chain network. The network consists of manufacturers, retailers and consumer markets engaging in a Cournot-Nash game. Retailers are responsible for collecting WEEE in the network. It is assumed that the price of the remanufactured goods is different from that of the newly manufactured ones. The network equilibrium occurs when all players agree on volumes and prices. Several properties of the model are examined and the modified projection method is utilized to obtain the optimal solutions. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the impact of CLSC parameters on the profits of channel members and consumer benefits, and to provide policy support for governments. We find that it is necessary to regulate a medium collection rate and a certain minimum recovery rate. This is also advantageous to manufacturers in producing new manufactured products. The impact of collection rate and recovery rate on manufacturers are greater than that on retailers. Consumers can benefit from the increase of the recovery rate as well as the collection rate.
机译：本文研究了电气和电子设备（WEEE）的浪费，并利用变分不等式对闭环供应链网络进行建模。该网络由从事古诺·纳什游戏的制造商，零售商和消费者市场组成。零售商负责在网络中收集WEEE。假定再制造商品的价格与新制造商品的价格不同。当所有参与者就数量和价格达成一致时，就会出现网络平衡。检查模型的几个属性，并使用改进的投影方法获得最佳解。提供了数值示例，以说明CLSC参数对渠道成员的利润和消费者利益的影响，并为政府提供政策支持。我们发现有必要调节中等收集率和一定的最低回收率。这也有利于制造商生产新制造的产品。回收率和回收率对制造商的影响大于对零售商的影​​响。消费者可以从回收率和回收率的提高中受益。

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