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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of information and computational science >Buy back Contract under Fairness Preference Coordinating Dual-channel Supply Chain
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Buy back Contract under Fairness Preference Coordinating Dual-channel Supply Chain

机译：在公平偏好协调双渠道供应链下回购合同

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摘要

This paper develops a coordinating model of dual-channel supply chain made up of one supplier and one retailer, who is endowed with fairness preference and laces a stochastic demand influenced by his sales effort. By introducing the fairness preference into the buyback contract, the comparts of fairness preference on the coordination of dual-channel supply chain are probed carefully. It is proved that whether the retailer concerns fairness or not, the dual-channel supply chain can always achieve coordination as long as the contract parameters are given proper values respectively. Furthermore, the numerical analysis shows the influence of retailer effort on the order strategy of channel members, and the influence of fairness preference on the utility of retailer and the whole supply chain and the profit of the supplier, which can be referred for the decision-making of each channel member.
机译：本文建立了一个由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链的协调模型，该供应商具有公平偏好，并受到其销售努力影响的随机需求。通过将公平偏好引入回购合同，仔细探讨了公平偏好在双渠道供应链协调中的作用。事实证明，无论零售商是否关注公平性，只要分别给定合同参数适当的值，双渠道供应链就能始终实现协调。此外，数值分析还显示了零售商的努力对渠道成员订购策略的影响，以及公平偏好对零售商的效用和整个供应链以及供应商的利润的影响，可以作为决策依据。每个频道成员的制作。

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