...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of informetrics >Megajournal mismanagement: Manuscript decision bias and anomalous editor activity at PLOS ONE
【24h】

Megajournal mismanagement: Manuscript decision bias and anomalous editor activity at PLOS ONE

机译：大型期刊管理不善：PLOS ONE的稿件决策偏向和异常编辑活动

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Since their emergence just a decade ago, nearly 2% of scientific research is now published by megajournals, representing a major industrial shift in the production of knowledge. Such high-throughput production stresses several aspects of the publication process, including the editorial oversight of peer-review. As the largest megajournal, PLOS ONE has relied on a single-tier editorial board comprised of similar to 7000 active academics, who thereby face conflicts of interest relating to their dual roles as both producers and gatekeepers of peer-reviewed literature. While such conflicts of interest are also a factor for editorial boards of smaller journals, little is known about how the scalability of megajournals may introduce perverse incentives for editorial service. To address this issue, we analyzed the activity of PLOS ONE editors over the journal's inaugural decade (2006-2015) and find highly variable activity levels. We then leverage this variation to model how editorial bias in the manuscript decision process relates to two editor-specific factors: repeated editor-author interactions and shifts in the rates of citations directed at editors - a form of citation remuneration that is analogue to self-citation. Our results indicate significantly stronger manuscript bias among a relatively small number of extremely active editors, who also feature relatively high self-citation rates coincident in the manuscripts they handle. These anomalous activity patterns are consistent with the perverse incentives and the temptations they offer at scale, which is theoretically grounded in the "slippery-slope" evolution of apathy and misconduct in power-driven environments. By applying quantitative evaluation to the gatekeepers of scientific knowledge, we shed light on various ethics issues crucial to science policy - in particular, calling for more transparent and structured management of editor activity in megajournals that rely on active academics. (c) 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
机译：自从十年前出现以来，近2％的科学研究现在由大型期刊发表，这代表着知识生产的重大产业转移。如此高通量的作品强调了出版过程的多个方面，包括同行评审的编辑监督。作为最大的大型期刊，PLOS ONE依靠一个由大约7000名活跃学者组成的单层编辑委员会，从而因其作为同行评审文学的生产者和看门人的双重角色而面临利益冲突。虽然这种利益冲突也是较小型期刊的编辑委员会的一个因素，但人们对大型期刊的可扩展性如何可能引入有害的编辑服务动机知之甚少。为了解决这个问题，我们分析了PLOS ONE编辑者在该期刊就职十年（2006-2015）的活动，并发现活动水平高低不一。然后，我们利用这种变化来模拟稿件决策过程中的编辑偏见如何与两个特定于编辑的因素相关：反复的编辑与作者互动以及针对编辑的引文比率的变化-一种类似于自我报酬的引文报酬形式引用。我们的结果表明，在相对少数极度活跃的编辑人员中，稿件的偏见明显增强，他们在处理的稿件中还具有相对较高的自被引用率。这些异常活动模式与他们提供的有害激励和诱惑相一致，这在理论上是基于动力驱动环境中冷漠和不当行为的“滑坡”演变。通过对科学知识的守门人进行定量评估，我们揭示了对科学政策至关重要的各种道德问题，尤其是要求在依赖活跃学者的大型期刊中对编辑活动进行更加透明和结构化的管理。 （c）2019作者。由Elsevier Ltd.发布

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号