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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >How do political institutions affect fiscal capacity? Explaining taxation in developing economies
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How do political institutions affect fiscal capacity? Explaining taxation in developing economies

机译：政治机构如何影响财政能力？解释发展中国家的税收

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A central aspect of institutional development in developing economies is building tax systems capable of raising revenues from broad tax bases, i.e. fiscal capacity. While it is recognised that fiscal capacity is pivotal for state building and economic development, it is less clear what its origins are and what explains its cross-country differences. We focus on political institutions, seen as stronger systems of checks and balances on the executive. Exploiting a recent database on public sector performance in developing economies and an IV strategy, we estimate their long-run impact, distinguishing between the accountability and transparency of fiscal institutions (impartiality) and their effectiveness in extracting revenues. We find that stronger constraints on the executive foster the impartiality of tax systems. However, there is no robust evidence that they also improve its effectiveness. Our findings also suggest that the overall impact on both total tax revenues and income tax is economically relevant.
机译：在发展中经济体中，机构发展的一个中心方面是建立能够从广泛的税基（即财政能力）中增加收入的税收体系。尽管人们认识到财政能力对于国家建设和经济发展至关重要，但尚不清楚其来源和解释其跨国差异的原因。我们专注于政治制度，被视为对行政机关进行更严格的制衡的制度。利用最近的有关发展中经济体公共部门绩效的数据库和IV策略，我们估计了它们的长期影响，区分了财政机构的问责制和透明度（公正性）及其在获取收入方面的有效性。我们发现，对行政人员施加更严格的约束可以促进税收制度的公正性。但是，没有确凿的证据表明它们也可以提高其有效性。我们的发现还表明，对总税收和所得税的总体影响在经济上是相关的。

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