首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >Hayekian welfare states: explaining the coexistence of economic freedom and big government
【24h】

Hayekian welfare states: explaining the coexistence of economic freedom and big government

机译:哈耶克福利国家:解释经济自由与大政府并存

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

To explain the coexistence of economic freedom and big government, this paper distinguishes between big government in the fiscal sense of requiring high taxes, and big government in the Hayekian sense of requiring knowledge that is difficult to acquire from a central authority. The indicators of government size in measures of economic freedom capture the fiscal size but ignore the Hayekian knowledge problem. Thinking about government size in both the fiscal and Hayekian dimensions suggests the possibility of Hayekian welfare states where trust and state capacity facilitate experimentation and learning, resulting in a public sector that is big in a fiscal sense but not necessarily more vulnerable to the Hayekian knowledge problem. Pensions in Sweden are used as a case to illustrate the empirical relevance of the argument. The new pension system represents big government in a fiscal sense, but by relying on decentralized choice it requires relatively little central knowledge.
机译:为了解释经济自由与大政府的共存,本文区分了在财政上要求高税收的大政府与在哈耶克主义下要求难以从中央政府获取知识的哈耶克式意义上的大政府。在衡量经济自由度时,政府规模的指标涵盖了财政规模,但忽略了哈耶克知识问题。从财政和哈耶克主义两个维度考虑政府规模,这表明了哈耶克福利国家的可能性,即信任和国家能力促进了实验和学习,导致公共部门在财政意义上很大,但不一定更容易受到哈耶克知识问题的影响。 。以瑞典的养老金为例来说明该论证的经验相关性。新的养老金制度在财政意义上代表了大型政府,但是依靠分散的选择,它需要的中央知识相对较少。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号