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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >Personnel is Policy: Regulatory Capture at the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929
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Personnel is Policy: Regulatory Capture at the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929

机译：人员是政策：联邦贸易委员会的管制捕获，1914-1929年

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This paper uses the concept of "Personnel is Policy" to extend the theory of regulatory capture to the political appointment of agency commissioners. The "Personnel is Policy" theory provides three important insights. First, it shows that whether or not an interest group benefits from a regulatory agency depends on the particular individuals appointed to run it. Second, the president plays an important role in regulatory capture by nominating individuals to be appointed to the commission. Third, regulatory capture does not follow a pre-determined path because the commissioners continually change. The theory is then used to explain the early years of a prominent regulatory agency created during the Progressive Era: the Federal Trade Commission. From the perspective of the big business "trust" interest group, their success at capturing the FTC to achieve their goals of controlling competition and blocking hostile antitrust actions was largely a result of who was appointed to the commission. The trusts were the most successful during the years of 1915-1916 and 1925-1929.
机译：本文使用“人员就是政策”的概念将监管俘获理论扩展到代理机构专员的政治任命。 “人为政策”理论提供了三个重要的见解。首先，它表明利益集团是否从监管机构中受益取决于被任命来管理它的特定个人。其次，总统通过提名要任命的人在委员会的监管中发挥重要作用。第三，由于专员不断变化，监管抓捕并没有遵循预定的路径。该理论随后被用来解释在渐进时代创建的一家著名的监管机构的早期时期：联邦贸易委员会。从大企业“信托”利益集团的角度来看，他们成功地占领了联邦贸易委员会以实现控制竞争和阻止敌对的反托拉斯行动的目标，很大程度上是由谁被任命为委员会的结果。这些信托基金在1915-1916年和1925-1929年间最为成功。

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